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Revolutionary strike ehhgy-the
strategy which
must be worked out and applied by the Trade Union Unity
League and ita fllliated unions-is designed to secure the
*tow of the working h both in iki everyday "bread
and b a W t strugglm and in the political ~ibcugglainto
which every d o u s econdmic conflict now develop8 almost
fmm the first day of battle.
The American working class, facing the moat powerfully organized and the best technicdIy equipped ruling
clasa in the world, haa the
need for studying its
own stmggIes, learning their strong and weak pin&, and
above all studying the rich experiences of the great conflicts that have taken place since the world wm and the
Rum4an.Revolution between workers and their robber rtrlem in the principal impeWst and colonial countries.
Especially must we study and draw the Iewna from
+he tremendous &us conflicts now in pmgreas, conflicts
which shake the whole imperialist world, *a
battles that
are widened and sharpened to revolutionary keenesa by
the world economic crisis.
To cmry out the greatest mobWtion of workem for
each m t e codlict, to be able to mass the whole atriking power of our dam on the weakeat point of the enmy
front in decisive conftida, to crtrrry through the OfFenafve
and cowlidate our gains-#are the h k s of rp rewlutionarg strike strategy.
F h t and fornost our aMke strategy must be mch as
to U e v a the maximum immediate results from each sepmate 8truggIe while guaranteeing that no atruggle rn
rrrainrr isolated fmm the general direction of the c b a
struggle asl a whole. It is here that the mvolutionarg nnl-

PREFACE

om of the Trade Union Unity League (T.U.U.L.) mme
into sharpest coeonflict with the opgortuniflt cunceptioa of
strike stnategy within oar own ranks, which seeti h ~ n e
disk "gab" for workers from the standpoint of the
d l reformists. Thb conception makm a fahe and me-
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chanical distinction between the daily economic in-b
of the mmrsma and the revolutionaxy aims, of the working
class aer a whole, that must be brought forward in werg .
etruggle.
No such &tinction exists except in the minds of thm
who see a aontdiction between the shggle for the
everyday economic demands and the revoIutionarg. necmab
ty of connecting them with the proletarian sfmggIe for
power.
The problem of building the r e v o l u t i o ~unions of
the T.U,U.Lthe American Section of the Red ][ntermk
t i o d of Labox U n i o n ~ r well
s as the problem of building
a ma& Communist Party in the United States is Iargely a
question of a correct strike strategy. With thia is bound
up the pmbIem of destroying the reformist illusions of the
Amerian Federation of Labor and the social fascists of its
Muste wing whose program is that of the Socialirrt Party,
Both of these problems are inseparable from the main
problem of winning thg. majority of the decisive. seetiom
of the working class for Communism. Seen from this
standpoint the importance of the question of working out
and applying a correct strike skate# is brought dearly
into the foreground-for our Party, for the revolutionary
trade unions and for our whole &as.
"It is clear that we must show the workers that we
know not only how to make a revoIution, but a h how to
l a d and direct their movements for partiaI demands, But
the chief thing we must realize
is that the road from
the dd-democrats to us Iiea -ugh
the trade unions,
through the trade union opposition, through the revolutionary trade unions, through tbe maser organizations (fm

. ..

strike commicommittees of unemployed, ek)''-Gommmist
hianrational, page 48,vol. Vlf,
No. 23.
In other wdrds our l & d p of the r e w l u t i o ~
struggle of our class can be won only through the m
e
l a m h i p of ntmgglehl for p&M. demandst, -ugh
our
ability to o r g a n h and lead the struggles of mass o&mtions of workers for padid demmda. It is at best ext r e m e doubtful whether any considertlb11 number of
workera will believe' in our ability 'Lto make a revolutionr'
unless we can orand lead the &er
but neassrtrJt
stnrggles which arise out of rationalization, and in which
we must be ibh to convince wurkem of 'the neceasitg of'
engaging in higher foma of struggle.
The retsoltltiom and d d s i m of the hterxfatiomd Conferenm on Strike Btmtegy held in SIma&up&, called by
the Executive Bureau of the Ited Intematiod of b b x
Uniioas (RJLU,) embody in mnmte fonn the experiences and lessons of the c h s ~truggleon a world 4 e :
&If d t i c b m in the l d n i s t sense wss the method used
to determine the wedmand the strength of the
proletarian forces involved in en whole series of ~tmgg1e8.
As Comrade h m l q says In the Toreword": W e
cannot limit ourselves to our forefathers' wisdom; we,
mlutioxu~rydialecticians, must direct our attention b
new factors, new situatim, and base omelves on t h w
new f b r s in analyzing these problems. Facta themIves
h v e proven that the r e f o d t .trade union bureaucmw
has become a part of the bourgeois government, having
the.sp&al Atn&w of b d n g 1-a.
This bing so,
we muat seek ways and mama of arming on the
mic ~ h g g l without
e
and despite the reformist
bmeaucracy,"
New forms and metbods of
Worker madm will find
of the new fonm d me
tory committea,

?

,
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of the shmpenhg class struggle in thh imperialist epoch
--and also how to organize and use them,
The united front from below a p ~ a r 8in its most concrete form in almost every section of the resolutioru and
decisions of the Stmsburg conference.
Out of these new f o r m and methods of struggle, and
the massee of the working class whose wetapom they am,
out of the struggle itself, develop the new and necessary force8 to lead the growing conflih which more and
more become struggles against capitalism and its governmat--political struggle8 in which the problem of power
k raised in one form or another.
In "New Tactics and New Forces" Lenin wrote in
1906:

"From all sides one hears with equal frequency passionate appeals for new forces and complaints of the absence
of people in the organizations, and at the same time a
gigantic offer of services, a growth of young forces, esptially among the working class . . The practical organizer who complains of shortage of people in such conditions cannot see the wood for the trees, admitq that he
is blinded by events, that it is not he, the revolutionary,
who dominates them . . . . but that they are dominating
him or have overwhelmed him. Such an organizer would
be well advised to keep quiet, or to leave his place free for
young forces, which have energy . . . . There are pcople,
there is a mass of people. We have only to throw overboard our $hilist' ideas and teachings to give space for
action and initiative, and then we shall prove ourselves
worthy represenbtives of the great revolutionary claas."
More forces are needed but they can come only from
the ranks of the new contmngents of the working class
that are marching into struggle. Correct strike strategy
correctly applied will bring f o m r d the needed forces.
Tried and tested by its ability to use the new forms and
methods of struggle, the revolutionary leadership of our

. . .
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&us develops 'out of the clam ahggle and collective experiences similar to those from which are drawn the praot i d mnclusions of the S W b a r g ~ n f e m o e .
The Amdam worldng elms will reap a rieh hamest
from the stndy of this pamphlet and in turn, by applying
the lessom herein aontained, wia, be able to add to Ita
growing sum of achievemenh in the United Statedi and
give revolutionary proletarian aid to the millions of workers and colonial peoples who are marching forward under
the revolutionary b a n n e ~of tbe Communist International
and the Red International of Labor Unions.

FOREWORD.

A Empean conference to study the
recent economic atrugglgle8, &led by the
the Red International of Labor
held in Strassburg, Germany, in the btter part of

,

,

of this year. Thb conference wilI
gortmce in determining the direction of the whole r m ~
lutionary trade union movement, and
participants were themselves in direct lead-Kp of tha
struggles, and were, so to to&,on the very field of
action, is very significant.
Altho several important mnflid (M and Ruhr)
have alxeady ended, we have on the,otherh d , a whole
aeries of new conflicts, and a review of even the preliminary m n l t s is of the utmost importance to all those htezL
ested in the complex quelitions of strike strategy d
tactics. It is, of course, possible g e n e d y to avoid eing these questions, or ta awider them from the viewpoint of the former membem of the German Communist
Par€y (the expelled Right Wing-Trans.) to whom the
very idea of independent leadership of emnomic s w e a
seems monstrous. They, having learned from childhood,
that economic struggles ehoutd be led by the M e uniom,
repeat these acquired laws, completely ignoring the pec~r
liaritie~in the situation, the condition of the trade unions .
and generally the facts in the m e . For them proecial
politicians there is nothing new in the world, and that ie
why their conception of Communist tactics takes on the
form of a refrain to the melodies of the left
dem-

.
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ocrats.

We cannot limit ourselves to our forefathem' wisdom;
we, as moIutionaxy dialectidmu, muat ddirect our attention to new factom, new situations, and base o d v a on
these factors in analyzing these problems. Faeta t b -
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FOREWORD

selves have proven that the reformist trade union bureaucracy has become a part of the bourgeois government,
the special function of breaking strkm. This being
w, we must seek ways and means of camring on the
ewnomic struggle witbout and deq* the refo&t a a d e
@on bureaamcy. And it was on this premiae that the
Profintern (B.KL.U.) d e d the conference on the question
of strike strategy and tactiw.
Fkpresentatives from England, Germany, Hungary,
Fbmce, Austria, Belgium and Poland participated in the
conference. Every participant told of hki own recent experiences. Inasmuch ora the conferenm waa not &led for
mutual eulogies, but for the etudy of positive and negative experiences, the reports on strikes and on the diffid t i e a ariain the process of the struggle were a e
aompanied by sharp criticism of our weaknesses and shortcomings. And our wakneases and shorbmings in Northern France, in the Rubr and in Lodz, were not few.
But this was nat criticism for criticism's sake, nor
malicious rejoicing by Eiome expelled membera of the German Communist Party over -failures, but healthy WEcriticism for the purpose of overcoming our wwkne~es
and misbkes. Altho the Vomarts" and its allies from
"~minstthe C m n t " take advanhe of this 8eIf-ti~ism for their right and left social democratic purpuses,
this shall not d e k us from continuing the line of selfcriticism in the future, and especially when we are faced
krith concrete tactical problems,
Arrayed against the adherents of the Red International
of Labor Unions is a united front of employers, bourgeois
governments, social democrats, Amsterdamites, and former
members of the Cornintern (Communist International)
who are now against any attempts of the revolutionary
opposition to independently lead the economic gtmggles
08 the proletariat. The difficulties in this task are enormow, and therefore mistakes and shortoomings are ina

I

d

I
I

witable, but theae will be cone&& not in moaw .@ d$&
treri4 but thnr the fires of struggle and severe>.I&&
e r i t i h . This is the opinion of all revolutionary w d @
-f
all those who recognize that there hi ao i ~ k k
way of ovemmhg these difficulties thrm t k t
out by the IV Congress of the R.I.L.U.
What pmblem~ldid the conference have under d d &
ation? This will be seen from the resolution w M fob
lowa. Here we find the question of preparation for the
rrtruggle, of the i n s h e n b to be employed, the
and methods of Iendership, the participation of the
strata and ~tegoriesof workem, qumtiom of
formation, ommunicatiom, elfdefense, e k
tiom w i d e r e d at this conference &ace
dl p
the emmmic struggle, Taking as its base the de&om
of the UI and W Congresses of the R.I.L.U. the conference approached the ~ t a i k eas rr f o m of warfare, &
therefore attempted to outline methods of d e n s e and de
feme for 'the militant working dass army, enab?hg it to
secure a maximum degree of success in battle. Social-demoerrrtic strategists and theft understudies, gathered mund
the journal "Against the Current" will, cif coarse, say that
such attempts are doomed to failure, It is hpossible,
they wilt say, to foresee aU that might happen, Thk
certainly ia correct. It is impossible ta foresee atl. Ye&
if we were to accept this point of view, we would imply
have to deny the very possibility of a military science.
Pet, military schools, notwithstanding, are haching stmrtegg and tactics. A critical anetly~isof the egperiencerr of
previow wars and of each battle sepmtely ia given sla3
the basic mume material for the study of military ~ c i m
in every country.
then, m n o t m analysis and study
of the gigantic economic battles render us instructive
material? It is only reformist narrow-mhdednese which
m o t see the use and necessity of drawing lemons f h m

my,

struggles.
This does not mean that the conference could g r e d b e
a recipe applicable to dl emergencies. The conference
codd give attention to m e particular questions, studg

the mistakes in order to avoid them in the future, emphasize those methods which have been advmtqgwu~Jy
applied, so aa to again utilize them against our enemies-in a word, out of the experiences of our last struggIes
barn the proper lessons for the coming struggles. Thia
is not only poaaible, but absolutely necesstwy. If the reformists do not do this, it is only bemuse they wish to
avoid the struggle, because they are not grepawiug for
class war, and therefore are not in the lewt interested
in learning lea;50ns of a s s w m .
With the dasa struggle sharpening, all prattle a b u t
&ss colaboration, geolce in industry, economic demo-,
e k , is nothing more nor lew than a smoke hlcreen behind
which reformist strategy is hiding. This is the form and
method of disrupting the proletarian front and the proletarian rear in the interests of our elws enemies. That is
why, in studying the experiences of strike strategy, it
necessary Jw,at the same time to give our serious attention to the question of how to expose the mmouvem of
the united fmnt of the bourgeoisie with the reformkb
against the fighting proletarian army.
As the resolution is very detailed rrnd ap&
fox its&, we shall d e no comments here. Every &a conscious worker rnuat study it carefully, point by pohk It
would be an exaggemtion to say that the following
solution has taken into account every emergmq, but there
is no doubt at all of the fact that many important experiences have been aopuired. It is the duty of all the
adherents of the R.I.L.U. to ~upplementthese experiences,
to add to them, to test them in the coming etruggles, and
upon the basis of the strickst check-up and d - c r i t i d a m

1

.

contime further dong the path of independent leadenhip
in economic struggle8.
Such politicians will be found (there are many writing
in the organ "Against the Current") who will say that
the attempts to work out tactic8 for the economic struggle
is mamho-~iyndiwlism(see the phenominal discovery of
Walcher in No. 3 of "Aminst the Current"). This is
amrdwsyndicaIism, they say, because here is a m p b
between the economic and political struggles of the prole
tariat. But Walcher wilI not be successful in evading u
serious question merely by calling it auarcho-syndicalism.
Walcher, like dl opportunists, evinces a great desire to
count the Communist International (hereafter abwviated
C*L-Ed.) and the Red International of Labor Union8
anarcho-syndicalist institutions; but this is nothing more
than attempting assault by foul means. In these deckions
there cannot be found the slightest indication of a rupture
between the economic and politica1 phases, nor any attempt b place the economic battle above the p o l i t i d
battle. The existence of the inter-relationship between
economic and politiea1 battles has been established by the
R.I.L.U. from the very day of its inception and by no
means can or should this prevent the examination of any
questions arising out of economic dashes. Today every
economic conflict is inherently politicaI in character, and
to try to find misbkes in the R.LL.U. along this line, ia
simply a waste of time. A review of experiences is a
most important step towards effective leadership in the
coming struggles.
Thk is what the conferenm held at Strassburg prochimed, and this is what every adherent of the R.I.L.U.
must devote his attention to.
b

I

*

*
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The conference made no decisions on the question of
the unorganized, considering, and correctly so, that this

FOREWORD

and the C.I. Thids question is a new one. Recent struggles
have proven the militancy of tbe unorganized, and therefore the problem of organizing the unorganized, the forms
and meth& of organizing the unorganized, must be are
fully studied. The fact that during the process of a h g gle, the question of the unorganized has reached the center
of attention, that this question has become one of the
points of diversion for the group8 leaving the Communist
International; that former Corrrmuniets are attacking the
Cornintern (C.I.) a d Profintern (R.I.L.U.) especially on
this point; that on this question they are in complete
agreement with the social-democra-1
this is evidence
of the fact that the Communist Intmmational and the
Profintern have touched upon the 80Te spot of intermtiond reformism.
The most important thing here ia experience, lstndying
the extent of organization, the form and character of the
unorganized participation in ;struggl~,the means of maintaining influence over the unorganized masses after the
termination of strikes, etc. This question is new, thk
qnestion is complex and requires an exhaustive dism~ion.
Therefore, the conference acted correctly h making no
decision on this question.

It ia the duty of dl the adherents o f the R.I.L.U. to
make s thorn study of the expriencea in all muntriea, to
dmw broad drclea of revolutionary trade union l&em,
aa well as rank and file members of the bade unions, into
the discussion, in order ta faditate a final decision on the
b a h of mllective experiehceg sand debiled discussion. We
a= convinced that the decisions made by the Corninten1
and Profintern will be reached in auch a manner, and not
in amordance with the views indicated by gronpa expelled
from the Cornintern.

As we have a h a & stat&, the d W o m wcepW b~
the conference are ao detailed that they r
e
q
m no mmk
ment. We request th8t dl of you, readem -oi the rev*
lutionary labor press, express your views upon the qmb
tiona d d t with by the conference. The more work*
participating in this discussion, the more e x p d e n w t&em
into acmunt, the better will it be for the r e v o l n ~
trade union movement;. Every adherent of the R.I.L.U.
wiU understand the reason for working out such detailed
resolutions. The workers must not be frightened by rn
series of new problems. Our adherents must understand that we will have to travel new paths, and establish new ,
landmarks, while under the fire d our class enemies, of
social reformism and capitalist class supporters. An open
discusdon of all these questions will be of great assistance
to the whole molutionary trade union movement. H d
lies the significance and importance of the Interntionid
Conference on Problems of Strike Strategy and Tactia
A. ILomvsrky, 1929.

PROBLEMS OF STRIKE STRATEGY

DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON STRIICE STRATEGY.
The tremendous economic conflicts and battles which
have occurred since the IV Congress of the Profintern in
a number of countries--Germany, Poland, fiance9 Greece,
etc., involving
and hundreds of thou-&
of workers,
baa unquestionably confirmed not only the correctness of
the economic and political analysis made by the angress
with respect to the Im p i w t oountriea, but dm
the ~orreck.le&s
of the strike strategy and tactics outlined
by it.
From t h e very moment of inception, and in some case&
during the pmc&s of development, thew strikes and lockouts were marked f b t , by their mass and political char
acter, and aecond, by the definite manifestation of d e
menb of offensive and oounter-offenstive on the paxt of
the workem.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that With intensified mtiondization, the growing capitalist offensive and
the increasing activity of the toiling masses, we now
find ourselves at the beginning of a growing movement
of politid and economic dashes between Iabor and capital..
And it is dm certain that only real, revolutionary leadership can insure the rsuwessful outcome of these battles.
These conditions make it imperative upon the adhemta
sf the R.I.L.U. to bend every effort to w r e s t leadership
out of the hands of the treacherous labor fakers and to8
take upon ourselves independent leadership in economic
struggles.
Among the mng difficult and intricate obstacles confronting the revolutionary trade unions and the adherents
of the Profinkm, it is most imperative to overcome the
'
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oppothmbt tendencies of the l e ~ ssstable elements in our
own ranks who have f d m under the influence of the
reformists. These opportunist tendencies are expremed
in bade union legality (fear of violating the constitution,
obedience to the orders of the reformist buxeaucrata, e k , )
in falling behind the masses, in the underestimation of the
militancy

I

of thb masses, in an inadequate understanding

of the connections existing between the economic end
goEtieal struggles. These opportunist &takes very harply manifest& themaelves during huge economic conflicb
when it was n e w m y to urn the utmost exertion, end*
an=, flexibility and the ability 20 apply the revolutionary
M c s hid down by the IV Congre~e. All wavering and
vacillation in our own ranks must be most drastically
and decisively eradicated at once.
One of the weakest wink in the work of the rev*
l u t i o trade
~
unions and the trade union opposition, B
the inadequate study of the experiences gained in the
struggle. The strike wave of even the lollst few months
has rendered a w d t h of materid which must be well
utilized in the approaching etruggles. The fight for hdependent leadership in economic conflicts, is steadily
becoming more and more of a gene& phenomena in face
of the continued, bmzen strikebreaking role of the refomist trade union bureaucmcy. However, the forms and methods of the struggle change, depending upon the apedie
conditions of a given industry, the rehrtiorwhip of foin the working class, etc.
How ahall this struggle be carried on? W b t Wmmen& must be mated? How is the offensive ofthe ?mews
.and the reformists to be paralyzed in the process of the'
ehggIe? How are t h e unorganized, the women and tbe
young worken to be drawn into the struggle? Roa b
the whole working elarcs to be mobilized to aid the 'work
I I era? such are the questions confronting every partidpant .
and leader of present day economic strugg1es. And hem

.

I

I

I

1

I

i

PROBrnkTS OF STRIKE 8TRATRGY

the experiences in L o b would have been very beneficial
- to Germany and France. The experiences in France miffht
have been useful in Germany, and the German experiences .
might have been of benefit to other countries. We do not
~ufficientlystudy the lessons of how and what has been
done. Frequently, we apply tactics as of old, and we h-;
provise even in such cases where experiefice has already
proven the sucee~~ful
application of some form, of some
method of ftruggle.
That is why it is the task of the adhemnta of the
Pmfintern to most carefully study every economic cona c t . We must Iearn to overcome all the difficulties in
our path. We mu& ;sanely judge oar weakne~es and
shortcomings. Only on the basis of a deWled analysis of
the positive and negative experiences of past economic
conflicts can we take an important step f o m x d in preparing our own ranks and the whole working class for the
threatening clasa battles between labor and capital.
I. PREPARING THE MASSES FOR STRIKES AND
I@CKOUTS

The experiences of recent strikes in Frmce, Germany
and Poland have ahown that there has not been sufficient
preparation for these 8trikes and lockouts. In order that
the workers shall not be taken unawares, the b d e union
opposition and the independent revolutionary unions must
carry on their work in the following manner:
1. It is the duty of every revolutionary union and the
trade union opposition (left wing) in every industry to
organize the workers for future conflicts and strugg1~.
2. At the first apparance of symptom of growing
dimtisfaction on the part of the workers, or aggressive
intentions on the part of the employem, in a given industry, the question of an approaching conflict must be
brought sbrply before the maase8.

P
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must be carried on under the following dqps: "Do 4
rely on the trade union bureaucrats J" "Taks the init'
in your own hands!" "Set up your own o e k b n $
forms!" 'Trepare for the struggle, otherwb you will h&
defeated!" In this agihtional work all concrete w
e
a
r sTle
treachery by the trade union bu-ucqacy in recent wonomic struggles must be utilized.
4. It is neceasarJr during thk preparatory period, tbm
personal conversations and pressure at meetings ta dngb
out those elemenb among the non-Pam, refombt, e
do-syndicalist or mtholic workera who may be dmwn
into the stmggle against the employers on the basis of .
our independent tactics, i.e., not dependent on the trade
union bureaucracy, and to participate together with the
revolutionary workers. in our independed instrumenh of
struggle hop committees, strike committees, mmmiWer
of action, eh.-Ed.).
6. The economic demands must be clear and underatandable to the masses, muat corn4 as a result of a anm t e situation, must be discussed by all workers involved,
for only under such circumstanm can these demanda ab
tract the majority of the workers and become the baais
of a united front from below and of uniM action.
& During the preparatory period an important mle
may be played by conferences of &op and factory rep*
sentatives, or conferences of shop committees, providing
that the latter are not under the influence of the reformish and are not instmmenh of dass-oolIaboration.
7. The revolutionary trade unions and the trade anfm
opposition must carefully examine and constan~ycheck
up on the work of all its imtrumenh, from the viewpoint
of contact with the mass of workers in the variotm fwh i e s . EspeciaUy must all signs of red tape or bureauhindering them from reacting quickly to any dqelopemt
among the work ex^ be combatted.
q
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8. The revo~utionargtrade unions and the M e union
opposition must carry on all of ita prepxtory work in

such a manner that the need for creating militant h s h ments to lead the strnggIe ~houldemanrrte from the rank
and file workers. This question &ouId become the subject
of discussion in all factories and ahopa.
9. At the approach of a Ioekout, it is necessary to b
aue dogans for the creation of m i l i t a ~ tcmmithea of
stmecggle against the lockout, elected in the factory by a11
the workm, ~ g a r d l e a aof their Party and trade union
affiliations, organized or unorganhed.
10. In case of Pavorable conditions- for a strike, and
with a militant mood gremihg among the masses, the
creation of strike comms'tteea (this also holds true in thoae
cases where the trike I 8 led by revoIutionary trade unions)
elected by all workera should be undertaken, Workers of
all beliefs and afiliations must participate in these elections,
the organized, aa well as the unorganized.
11. At the same time, the sharpest agitation and
pmpaganda must be d e d on among the mawa a-t
the a p p o i ~ t of
~ tsMke committees from the top (i.e.,
by the bureaucrateMne.) and against efforts of the
trade union bureaucrats to transfer the leadership in these
conflicts t o such committees.
12. Prepamtion of the working masses for the struggle must be d e d on not only orally, but also in the
presa. In this regad the trade union and Psrtg. press is
taxed with ID serious duty. It is neees~aryto iswe ape&
ldeter, special supplements of the press, 8h0p g a w ,
etc., dealing with the approaching conflict.
13. f t ia mmt dangemus in the emmmic struggle to
call a strike, or impmvbe one, under the influence of a
passing mood, and nut &er cold calculations. -ern
are required to poawss complete i n f o m t i w not only
about the condition of zb given branch of hdushy, but
also about what is going on among the m m . The task

'

but
lies in not being tardy, wt dansling in tbe
the ability to grasp the readhas of ~JMmnannn to
And even then, the task i~ not to declare a a
would pronounce w decree, without mbus
preparation of the masses for the struggle.
14. The selection of the h e for the d e c k a h d# I
the strike Is e s g W y imporhnk In thirs comectio~
experiences ia Lo&, where the deckmation waa
,
mwt carefully ba studied. The selection of am
'moment may predetermine an unfavorabIe end to the amflick !his k why, dter lengthy prepamtiona, the d
b .
tion of the abike must be timed at the moat fammbb
moment for the workers. The selection depends upon the
-situation, time and place, upon the relationship of fome~,
Ipoliciea of the bosses, etc,
'C
15. In the preparatory period it hi necesmry to mbb
:
the question of a strike fund for the ahikers or the lockI
d 4 u t workers, espechlly in those countriehi and thoae
unions which do not have strike funds. Altho it ia m n g
to rely upon the ability of the workers to gain a victory
over the h s e s merely on the baais of a full W u r y , it
is equally wmng to postpone the consideration of way^
and means af aiding the strike= and locked out workem
.
(fiance) until after the struggIe has already started

1
._
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M)=,
CHARAWR AND FUNCTIONS OF
TIIE INSTRUMENTS OF STRUGGLE*

All of the preparatory period must be utilized for explaining to the workers involved the neaeasib of o r g d w d
preparation for the struggle. Thia means that we r w t
populmh the mmmitteers of ~truggleagainst Iockonh,
strike committees, special commissions which must take
the leadership of the straggle upon tbemselvea. In the
aixe of an appmwhing lockout it is necessary to begin
elections for committew of ~ m g l m
e
t lwkoutg. And

PRDBLEYS OF STRIKE STRATEGY

few days before the cding of a strike, it is necessary
to begin elections of strike committees. It is always necessary to commence elections of anti-Ioelrout committeen or
strike committees a few d a y s before the declaration of the
lockout or the strike. In cue a lockout is decIared unexpectedly, or if a strike arises suddenly, or d m if it is
impossible to have the committees elected in due time,
it is necessary at the moment of the d h m t i o n of the
strike or lockout, while the workers have not yet dispemed, ta arrange a general meeting of the workers at
8

which, after due agitation, a proposal for the election of
a committee should be made, naming for thia parporn a
prepared list of revolution&, reformist, amrcho-syndicaliplt, catholic and non Party workers.

.

With regard to the compo&ivn of the strike committee, it ia espcidly important that the elections for
strike committees be c a d & on in dl shops and even in
craft group^, and that they be widely representative of
all the ahgoriw and groups of workers, aa for inatan=,
the shop delegations in Lo&. The election s y s h n should
be determined accurding to the extent of the conflict and
the shops involved. The more strike committe~there we,
the easier it will be for them to guide the maas of
workers. In small shops the strike committee may be
electad on the bmia of one for every 25 to 60 workera;
in larger shops one out of every 100 to 200. In the vew
large factories where tens of thousands of workers are
employed, the strike committee should consist of from
200 to 800 geopIe. Such large reprewnhtive strike canmittees mast elect their own executive commitbea, whose
duty it would be to arrange regular meetings of all the
mwnbera of the committee, be responsible to them, keep
them informed, keep contact t
h them with the qtrikem
by assigning to each member of the strike committee defmite reaponaibilitiea. W
i
t
h mgwd to the functions af the

strike committees, and their tasks, it ibi necessary for
them to attain the following:
1. The atrike committee has the task, employing all
means, to carry on the struggle for the &ation
of the
workers' demands. The auccesafnl termination of the
struggle will depend upon the extent to which the strike
committee is successful in eliminating the influema of the
d o r m i s t union from the factory and in taking the Ieade~"
ship of the strike out of its hand^, 2. The strike committee m u ~ lead
t
the shggle, enter
into negotiations and sign agreements if neoetisary, d e
dazing at the outbreak of the strike that any agreements
entered into by the reformi~tbureaumats are not binding
upon the workem.
3. T h e strike committee must be mrutantly dert to
every move of the trade union bureaucrat., When they enter
into machinatiom with the bosses, demonstratiom should
be orgauized in front of tbe building8 where they me
located and a systematic campaign should be d e d on
to undermine the faith eapecidly of social-democratic and
catholic workem in the r e f o h t and catholic trade union
bureaucracy.
4. Strike committees must become the powerful tools
in the hands of the trade union opposition with which to
drive all agents of the bosses and aMea of the b o w out
of the b d e uni011.
6. The strike committees must draw the hop committees into full participation in the struggle, but if the
latter should trail after the trade
bureaucrats, then
the strike committee must carry on as severe a fight
against them as against the trade union bureaucmcy.
6. The ba~ictask of the strike committee is, not d y
to concenhte the attention of .the masses on the slogma
put forth in our s t r u g g l e , but what is
important, to supplement the original slogans in tbtn
come of struggle, with new do-,
includh aoW

demands, depending upon the new situations and the
chauging conditions, never pedtting the initiative to dip

from ita hands.
7. The strilre cumnittee cannot and mwt not adopt
the attitude of "All or Nothmg". It must be capable of
maneuvering (of a m ,not in the rJense of malriag top
combinations) and quickly and correctly determining which
aide will hnd to benefit by a change in the relationship
of fomes which occurs during the process of the struggle.
Unnecessary rigidity and insufficient flexibility is CQ)D.to dl practices of revolutionary clasz3 warfare.
8. For the n o d leadership of a h i k e or lockout,
the strike oommiths or the anti-lockout aommittees must
unite all the workers involved in the conflict, In the case
of big lockouts or strikes, embxacing a number of factories
in s large district, or a whole bran& of industrg, it is
necessary to create a central strike committee on the
bash of representation from local strike committees.
9. Demomatidly elected strike or mti-lockout cornrnittees must establish the etricted discipline within the
committees in order to secure a successfd bmhution to
the struggle.
10. During the election of militant anti-1dtout committees, or strike committees, it is necessary to secure a
decision providing for the right to recall those tnmbel%
of the committee who may afterwards refuse b execute
the tasks imposed upon them for the energetic &ng
on of the struggle, thus violating the will of their eIectom.
f 1. The militant anti-lockout committees, strike committees and other instruments of struggle must bot
see to it that all workers involved in the conflict are
regularly registered, but also to establish regular control
centers for the purpose of strengthening connections with
and utiIizing the greatest possible number of workers for
active participation in the struggle.
12. The strike c0mmitk.s must establish and maintain

om
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the closest oontaeta between the:

unempIoyed workers in order to fmstra
utilize the unemployed in disrupting the

nx. OUR

TACTICS IN DEMOCRATI
STRIKE COMMTJXES.
The strike committee, being an instrument elected k$
the mas~es,must necessarily be composed of workers d f
various beliefs and affiliations (religious, political, e h ; )
therefore, in the preliminary stage8 of the struggle, the
adherenh of the R.I.L.U. may even find themselves in the
minority. In such cases the revolutionary workers mt
manifest the greatest patience and bct, and the abilik
to convince the majorits of the need of revolutionary
tactics.

F'irst of all, whenever the question arises of ~hmpenhg
and broadening the struggle, the adherents of the R.LL.U.
must be the most disciplined and self-sacrificing members
on the strike commitbe. Untiringly, at all meetings of
the strike committee, must they criticise the indehiveness, vacillation and hesitation of the reformist and cathe
lic leaders and expose their machinations. Tn caw the
strlke committee should waver, the adherents of the Profintern must demand that the question of the continnation
of the struggle be presented to a meeting of the shikem
for a decision. If this demand ia not granted,our followera
must go before the masses of the strikers- and raise the
question of the re-election of the strike committee, propin8 to replace the hesitant ones with more decisive and
determined leaders.
SimultaneousIy with the withdrawal of the revolutionary minorities from a strike committee which had3 fallen
under the influence of the reformists, the minority must
appeal to the mass of workem and organhe- the election
of a new strike commithe in order to continue the s h g - .
gle.

,:
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In e x m e cases when the majorit9 of the m d t t e e
falls under the influence of the reformists and breaks a
strike at a time when the mass of workem still show a
readiness to continue the struggle, the revolutionary wing
must and should withdraw from the strike committee.
The adhemh of the R.I.L.U. must organhe the masses
to directly control the activities and work of the stxike
committee and resolutely fight againat all tendencia to
make the strike committee merely a auberidiary body of
the union, even if the union be a revolutionary one ( n o d ern France). The fundamenu task of the adherents of
the Profintern id3 to bring their beat mid most energetic
workers, by means of demomtic elections, into these
lealing mrnmiks as memberar. By their energetic example and consistent &s
line, by always acting in a
reqonsible organized manner, by never betraying 'the
masses who have elected them, and by winning the confidence of the masses, these revolutionary members must
win the leadership of these committees, camyhg with
them the rank and Pile workem of various beliefs.
The h k of the adherents of the R.LL.U. is to
strengthen the confidence of the masses in the h s t r u merits of struggle (the ommittma) and actually lead the
masses by means of the non-Ptg strike and anti-lockout
committees.
IV. GUIDANCE, AND NOT COMMANDS.
A strike or lockout which involves broad masses of
workers creates fhvorable conditiom for widening, the influence of the revolutionary wing of the labor movement.
Ebwwer, this influem can grow only if the leading elementa manifest an acute sensitiveness to the desire8 of
the masses and establish a healthy relationship between
the strike committee md the striking workers.
The strike committee must be able to keep in constant

.

touch with the mwsea, continually reporting ta them, re-l
inforcing ibelf by adding new energetic dements fro1
among the strikers who have shown initiative, and carr~r-1
.ing on its work in ~ u c ha manner that the workers a
k e e p control over the committee.
I
It is especially dangerous for the strike cornmi1
resort to commanding the strikem ; to endeavor wbitra-l
rily to decide important questions, or to go so
reject certain demands or to a l l off the strike.
This system of cammands, as well as secret
must be ruthlessly eliminatd from the procedure of .tl
strike committees, the role and importance of which w
grow only insofar rn they are controlled by the maswa,[
and together with the masses decide on dl impo
auestions of t h e strike.
The control of the masses over the strike committee,
and the constant contact of the strike commitbe with il
masses, naturally does not exdude the posaibiIity of tl
strike committee in mrtato exceptional cirmtancw,l
making immediate independent decisions and reporting i
action to the m
e
r
e
s of the workers. In this figard tl
experiences in recent strikes should be carefully a h & #
and in dl cases where atrike mmmitteea resort to givh
commands, they should be subjected to the most rut-

-

>
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V. THE RF,LATIONSHIP B E r n E N S T R m COl
ULYlVlY D U ~ n U L / J S A b L .

he refo&istr select the atrike opmmibe~~
thd-1
or else endeavor to @cipa& in them. The d
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It is therefore abmluteIy necessary to see to it that
the strike committees are prevented from falling under
the influence of soda1 - democracy and the reformist
trade union bureaucracy and to resolutely fight against the
wopexation of official represenhtives of reformist trade
unions on strike committees. No official repvesmtation
of r e f m i s t trade unions should be permitted m the st&&
committees. The adherents of the Profintern must counteract all the efforta of the representatives of the reformist
trade unions t o penetrate into the strike committee by
putting forth the slogan that all membera of the etrike
committee mud be elected by all the workers, organized
and unorganized as well.
It is also neceseary to fight agtrinat the efforta of the
reformists to limit voting power for the strike committees
o d y to members of the trade unions. If a reformiat union
is formally l d g the strike, one or two representatives
with consuItative vote may be permitted. so that they may
report to the committee on the activities of the offi&h
in the union. AU efforts to weaken the struggle against the
trade union bureaucracy during the strike on the grounds
that they are now at the head of the a*ef must be most
vigorousIy condemned. It is^ especially during strikes that
intenagied work kt necesary, exposing the reformist trade
union bureaucracy, their methods of breaking atrikee, their
manipuIations behind the hcks of the workem, their connections with the bourgeoisie, with bourgeok mvernments,

,

etc.

This work of exposure must be c m k i on not only by
the Party press, not only by the p m of
~ @e trade union
opposition, but esgecidy by the strike canmiher, a
i only
by eounterpo&g t h e strike e o m m i b s to the trade union
buraucmcy ia it possible to atkin actual independent leadership of economic struggles. The slighteat i d e o b f i d or
o r g a n h t i o d dependence of the &&kg cmmttttw m the

4
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r s f m b t M e mion bzareazccraep or $he w e u h i ~ gof t h
fight agaiwt it may t& t o the fall in authore'ty of the trade
mi&noppdtion and ths strike committees weated thm its
i~itiatdwe.

VI. W UNITED FRONT DURING STRAND LOcKOUTS*
A sentiment among the masseB very wnducive to the
creation of a united f r o ~ ~from
b
below ia arouwd at the
approach of conflict. On the eve of the conflict it is necessary t o convert agitation and propaganda for the united
front into organizational channels. Towarda M a end the
following is necesiwy:
1. The beet and mmt militant workers of aU beliefa,Communists, Socialdemmts, Catholia, unorganized, etc.
m u s t be included in i
d W m which are elected.
2. Strike committees mu& ammission various p u p s *
comprised of strikers of all beliefs, to make reports to the
unions, etc,, on the pmgrees of the s m e , thus breakhg
the monopoly In the catholic unions of having regorb
made only by mtholiw, in the mdd-demowaic unions of
having them*made onIy by socialdemocrats, e k

3, It ia necessary to d o w non-party and reformist
workers to carry variouar fwnctians within the strike cammime in order that they may be d m into the Smm*
)
diab struggle.
4. fn making reports on the activities of the strike
. f o m n i t t e e ~ , the workem (nonparty, ostbolic am^ m ~ democratic), must see to it that their reports trre grinhd
in their prem
5. It is particularly hdpful during strikes and l&ub
to convene agedial broad conferences of o r g a h d and rmorganized workera (men, women and young workers), In

a0
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order to pick out and place the best and most energetic
of them in posh of militant leadership. b
6. During the strike or lockout special attention must
be given to the struggle against various combinations
among the leaders and attempts3 to set up a united fmnt
from the top.
1
7. Desarving of the most relentless condemnation are
those aawent of fhe Profintern who enter into agree
1
m a t s with the reformist leadem, for mutual mn-wgmsion, for the rejection of mutual criticimn, etc, during the
[
strike. This iis not the united fmnt. This is a malicioue
I'
perversion of the united front.
8. United fmnta during sees or lockou% are eshb
Eshed ta increase the fighing power of the masses, and.
not for the mutual protection of the Ieadws. That is ~ h 9
our h e for a close united fmnt with the workers of the
I
reformist organizations must go hand in hand with the'
sharpest fight against the reformist trade union bureaucmts.
9. One of the most effective means of developing the.
united front, of cementing and welding the ranks of the,
fighters together, is the organization of mass demonstrations and parades, under the leadership of the eIected corn-.
mitteea, against the bourgeois and socialdemocratic police,
against the bourgeois and e o c i a l d e m o ~ t i clo& authorities, etc.
10. The succemful formation of a united fmnt during
a strike or lockout must be utilized after'the termination
of the struggle to maintain and strengthen the contach
which have been established among the muses by the
adherenb of the Profintern What forms this work @hall
take must be decided in aooordanw with the situation in
each mutry, in the branch of indusw, the relationship
of f o m a within the working class, e t c It is absoIuMy
esaentirrl to uUze and ditrengben W work accomplished.

I
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VII, WOIRECERS' PICmTS AND D m S E CORPS.

The success of strikes in many cases depends upon the
organization of the picket lines and the ability of the
strikers to meet the a t w s of the gangsters a d the
strikebreakers in the pay of the employers. In this &gad
the organization of picketing and workers* defense COW
assumes an especially important role. The strike or lockout committee must do the following:
1. Absolutely all workers, no matter what their belief#
and affiliations, must be drawn into the picket line, in
such a manner as to have the experiend, militant comrades working together with the unorganized workem, the
~ d e m o c r a t s ,catholim, etc.
2, The leading pickets ahouId be carefully & o m ,
utilizing not only the young workers, but a1m the older
workem, men and women, and especially workers' wives.
3. The very broadest circle of workers must be drawn
%to the picket line (mass picketing) in order to engage
the largest possible number of workers in active work
during the strike.
4. Special demonstrations of strikers' wives and children against the strikebmkers and the police force defending the strikebreakers, is very effective.
6. Picketing must be obligatory upon aU strikers. No
worker can refuse to carry out this definite duty during
6. In countries having a fascist regime (Italy, P O W )
or those having organized employers and reformist shikeb d e m (United Shtes, England, Romania, )it
ia necessary from the very inception of the strike to ammence orgmkdng defense corps, drawing into t h m corps
the most active groups of workers.
7. It is especially deahble to draw into the picketline and into the workers' defense corps, members of workers' sport organizations, members of pml~kiimwden'o
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o r g h t i o ~ etc.
,
These a n play a very impohnt role
during the trike.
8. It k neoesmry to

tetrch not only

the picketa, but

aIl the strikem to draw the groper 0011cluslomfrom the
conflicts between the pickets and the state authorities,
pointing out to them the elementary fact-the connection
exiating between the employers and the Bourgeois govern
ment.
9. Especial attention should be given the fight argaimt
varioua police and private detective organhtioona (factory
d t h , detectives, shop spies, stool pigeons, fire brigada
which are part of the police force, e k )
VIII. 'WILl>-CAT'' OR UNOFFICIAL STRIKES*
The policy of i n k m a t i d reformism for the "peapeaceful" mlution of all economic conflicts by means of o
w
tory arbitmtion, by agatematic &ow,by the behJral
of the workem' demmda, places before the bmad maws
of workem the problems d f'ihting for elementary
demands without the consent and against the will of the
reformist trade union bureaucracy.
"WiTd-c~f' or unofficial strikes, i.e., strikes called by
the workers themselves without the smction and @mt
the will of offitid cenbal organg of respective unions,
were previously only occasional occurences. Now, they are
becoming the only means of counteracting the increased
exploitation and pressure of the employera. Strikes without the mction and againat the will of the union are
now occuring more and more frequently. They have
M
y become a mass phenomena, and in the future will
become more so. Therefore, it is our task to rehabilitate
the m-qdled "wild-c~t"or tmoBicial strikes, hamuch aa
the trade union bureaucrats reject the strike as a weapon

of shggle,
S e e s begun and continued without the eonsent of
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and apaimt the will of the reformist trade unions, especially in such countries where the bade union bureaucracy
in st;iu very strong (England, United States, Germany),
demand particularly serious prepmtion and the greatest
effort on the part of the adherenh of the Profintern.
First of alI it is necessary to overcome, within our
own mnks, an underegtimation of the strength of the
workers, m o v e r ~ s t ~ t i oofnthe strength of the reformi s t trade union bureaucracy and a fear of independent action
by the workers. It is necessary to carry on daily agitation and propaganda among the masses, emphasizing the
fact that the workers have nothing to hope for from the
reformist trade union Bureaucracy .which acts merely as s
brake on the workem' struggIe for even their .most elemen*
dam&.
It is especidly important, when a so-called "wild-c8t'
or unofficial strike has broken out, t o m u s e the initiative
and energy of the masses. Only by bringing the broad
masses into active partidpation in the straggle will it be
pomible to break thru the united front of the employem,
bourgeois atate and the retbrmi~ttrade union bmucracy.

IX. BROADENING TRE FIELD OF STRUGG=THE
PROBLEM OF RESEXlVES.
Under present mnditiona of truertification and coneen.

tration of capital each economic conflict raises befom the
worlrexs the problem of regerves. In the case of powerful
employers' organizations, commanding inexhaustible money
reaemea, relying upon the full force af the bourgeois government and r e f a d s t orgaaixationa, every economic mnMct aassnmes important political significance for the whole
working clam. Therefore, the problem of lmdenbg the
struggle, of drawing in new strab of workers and of Inl
d
g the m e s , aersumw ezroeptio~~dimpoM08
from the viewpoint of the development of the &a&e

'
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The struggle may be broadened either vertically or
horizontally, i.e., by embracing a11 workem, or an important part of dI the workem in a given indwtrg, or
branches of industry IverticalIy), or by involving aU the
workers in a given geographical territory (horizontally.)
In either case broadening the struggle is possible only
after very serious and energetic preparabry work hzt;s
been carried on among the various categorfes of workem
More, and especidy during the very height of the conflict.

The answer to the question, which category of workem
are to be called upon for aid (i.e., the workers in the
industry or h the geographical territory,) is to be determined by.asmbining which is tbe weakest spot for the

empIoyers in a given conflict. Firat of all, it is neceasars
to keep in mind all the s u b s i W e s connected with a given
trust. Attention must then be given to those concerns
which provide the raw materials, or which finish the
manufactured goods. It ia necessary to keep in mind dw
the possible transference of orders fmm one employer to
another, the %portation of necessary products or parts
from other sections of the country, or from abroad, etr,. '
A very strong weapon in the struggb is the aid of railway and waternay transportation workers and the workers in public service institutiom (eIecMc, gas, e k ) .
In all these cases, it is necessary to always keep in
mind the general situation and not ondy our d e b to
broaden the ~itruggle. We must consider the e x h t of our
influence, the degree of readineas on the part of the mrrssea and to what extent the massee are ready out of solidarity to join in the struggle. Therefope, we mu& underatand that in the pwpamtory period for the abvggIe and
during the aurae of the struggle, to imlah the movement
from the broad proletarian m w e a and other branches of
industry would precipitate a very grave danger.
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X. CONTINUATION OF TIfE STRUGGLE
DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITES 'OF

t

L
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THE REFORMISTS.
Experiences of m n t atrikes in Nodern
Ruhr, b d z , e k , have ahown that the reformisb,
unable to disrupt the movement from the very
choose the most appropriate moment during the
for strikebreakers to M e the fighting workers
b&.
Taking advantage of their influen- on a c w h k .
~trataof workers, and knowing that the most paadve
elements will dways follow those who propose ending 'the
strike, the reformis& systematically endmvor to disrupt -.
one mass movement after another, and do so under the
banner of socialim
Usually, the movement is disrupted by mans of ne- -'
gotiations d e d on behind the backs of the workers, '1
I
without the prmieaion or cement of the strikers. That
,
is why the adherenh of the Profintern are faced with
the task, before and during the strike, of canybg on an ':
. especially determined fight to have a general meeting of
the strikers decide the terms on which the conflict b
to end.
In all xecent strikee, the atrikebreaking &tic$ of the
reformists led to a situation where the majority of workera returned to work (with the exception of the Bhip
builders of Hamburg,) rand the adherents of the Pmfhtem ,
were concretely faced with the problem of whether the
struggIe should or could be continued in those paxticul&r'
'
establishments, or in those certain distri& where they
(the adherents of the Profintern) still had the decisive infIuence, The continuation of the strike in the V i M ' ,
factories and in Muen after the general a w e had been
broken in Lodz and in Northern m c e , m a perfec:tly
correct, both politidly and tactial1y. Of mum, 8 M n g
under such circumshceer is extremely dimcult, a
t the
workers' strenjgth ia already shattered. The retreat d*
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fected by the strike-*
mciddemucrats and the
Amsterdamites demoralizes the rrrnkis of the fighters, but
nevertheless continuation of the strike in certain ~i
is absolutely neces~ary--otherWise all the strikes 3x1 the
future will be disrupted by the systematic strikebmakhg
tactia of the rdormists.
Continuation of the strike after the majoritg of the
workem have returned, demands the utmost temcits, exceptional solidarity, the highest degree of class mnscioue
ness, and inexhaustible energy on the part of all who r+
maig in the battle. It is only under thew conditiom that
it is possible, not only to
on, but to win thEs partial
battle.
E w w e m e of such strikes (Vidzeff) have failed,
the conclusion must not be drawn that such methods of
struggle me incorrect. It ia mereIy nemerar~rto draw the
mncIusion, that in simiIAF c a m the adherents of the Profintern musrt W e special augplementary measure8 for the
organization and mobilization of the masses thruout the
country to aid those workem fighting on a d l s&n
of the sociakt front.

XI. HOW TO PREVE:NT THE DISRUPIJON
OF STRIKES.
The method of systematic strikebreaking by the reformist trade union bureaucracy sharply places before us
the question of how to prevent the dimption of strikes,
In t h i s regard our tasks are spdfied and of a protract4
nature. Complete insurance against the disruption of the
movement may ody be attained thru complete elimination
of reformist influen- among the masses; and therefore,
the sharper the class war, the more energetically muet
we fight against the reformist agents of the ca~iMsts
in the workers' midsk
The execution of this h k demands the greatest
organhtionaf., political and agitationd pmpagmdht ef-

-

forts in uniting the bmad masses on the basis of the dam
war. sum^ here depends upon our ability, en-,
COB
siatency, flexibiliw, per~iatency, and what is eqmh&
important, upon the tempo at which we .extend our pofitiw
influence, and upon the planned, o r g d t i o n d c o d *
tion of this influence. Regarding these p m h W tasks.
alI the necessary directives have been given in d e W d
forma at all Congresses of the W i n t e r n and the Rvfht8rn.
fn order to attain success, it ia necessary:
1. To sharpen the fight against a?lthe allies of capital:
warping the workem More, and especially during the
conflict, that the enemy is now within our own d s .
2. During the elections of the anti-lockout and sMke
committees and other bodies, to reject the candidacy of
any per;son connected with the social-democracy or the
trade union bureaucracy on the ground of their being
strikebreakers.
3. To see to it that only those persona are elected on
the leading bodiea who have a l r e d y p~ovmtheir devotion
to the cause of the workins class.
4. To sharpen the fight during the strike against
aompdsory arbitration and other bourgeois-reformist
methods of suppres&g the fight.
5. To systematically expose the tactics of dwsr ooUabomtion practised by the reformist trade union bureaumy,
thus breaking the faith of the masses in them.
6. To immediately react during the strike to every
auspicious step of the reformist trade union leaders, not
only in the p m ~ but
, especially at meetings of s M ~ m t ,
adopting re~oIutionscondemning capitulation, under+mer
manipulations, and strikebreaking.
7. To decisively fight against the right of W e union
bodies (managem, delegates, meetings, eta) to t h a m e h
settle the question of ending f i e strike.
Them questions must be decided by all the &rkm,
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organhd and unorganized, and the strike committee,
elected by the masses of the workers. The main thing is
to member that organized strikebreaking can ke counteracted only by strong and close org&nization. Therefore,
it is necessary, before and during the strike, ta strengthen
the fractions, broaden and strengthen the revolutionary
trade unions and the trade union opposition, and step by
shp to organizationally develop our incmuing politid influence. It is especially during big strikes that dl the
instruments of the Party, trade union opposition and
revolutionary trerde unions must put forth their maximum
& o h to h w new strata of workers into active struggle
against the strikebreaking reformists.
Only the most stubborn and systematic e£€ortatowards
the strengthening and welding of our rmka will make it
possible for ns to defeat the strikebreakers a d s u m s fully terminate the conflict against the united front of
the employem, the bourgeois h t e and the reformist trade
union bureaucracy.

ftII. STRIKE3 IN COUNTRIES WITH DrVIDED TRADE
UNION MOVEMENTS.
Revolutionary trade unions in countries with divided
W e union movements (France, Czecho-Slovrrkia, Roumania, Greece, Japan, etc.,) in applying international political
and tactid experiences in economic struggles, are faced
with a whole series of specific problems, which are especially sharply raised at the time of maas movements.
Wherem in wch countries ae Gemany and England, the
fight for the leadership of the massets irr carried on between the official organs and the opposition, in countries
with a divided bade unim movement, the fight for influence over the masses is carried on between two organi%atiom.
I
In such a situation one of the most important bsks
befow the revolutionary unions is the utilization of each

'

.I

-

'

wnomic conflict to strengthen their godtion, wthe base of the revolutionary M e d o n a by b h & b
in new members from among the unorg-,
at thtt expense of the reformist trade unions. EveryWng ~ & &
must be done, during, and immediately fobwing mass
movements, to liquidate m l e l reformkt organhtim, by
transferring all the members, or an overwhelming m a j o ~
ity of them, into the ranla of the revolutioqarg nniom
(see the resolution of the IV Congress of the -tern
on the first item of the agenda).
In this regard, the evrienwa gained in Bordeaux
during the strike of the longshoremen, where the refomist union8 completely disappeared because their members
b s f e r r e d into the Unitarian Union, are worthy of -aerious study and dupliation. Regarding those reformiat
trade unions, fmm which we have won over only part of
the membership during, or immediately after the strike,
measms should be taken to strengthen, politically and
organizationally, the influence of the revolutionary oppoaition within these uniom, in order ta win over the majority
of the membership, thus creating the condition for the liquidation of these reformist trade unions.
On the other hand, in the face of the ercistence of two
parallel, competing unions, it is essential,thstt the rev+
Iutionarg unionrt be extremely sensitive in regbtering the
moods of the masses and the stages of the fight against
the demagogy of the refomkt leaders, who are dwagii
ready to simulate skuggle for the sake of retaining their
infIuence over the mernbemhip. In ~ u c hcountriw, it b
especially dangerous for the adherents of the Frofinterm
to permit the initiative to slip from their hands. We must
not be deceived by the left phrases of the reformist leadem or truet in their abilitg. and desire to actu&lIy carry
on the struggle agthat the bourgeoisie. This would lead
directly to the destruction oi the revo~utionarytrade union

It is understood, of mwr~e,in m a where a local union
affiliated to a r e f o h t center really wages a fight
against the employers, that it is the tads of the revolutionary uqion to enter into a united front with this local union,
Wing precautions, however, against any possible tendencies tawards capitulation especially during decisive m*
menta of the strike. We must lead all the workers, those
organized in unions, as well as, and especially, the unorganid, thereby demonstrating in practice that only
the revolutionary W e uniom are cowistent defendem of
the interests of the toiling maeses. Therefore the fevolutionary o r ~ t i o m
must W e themselves on eIected
strike committees and establish the closest cooperation
with them. .
Only a m m t policy in the leadership of ecunomic
struggles can raise the authorits of the revolutionary
trade unions among the maaes, and ntrengthen them
poIitidy and organizationally. Thus can the revolutionary trade uniom be converted into organizations embracing
the majority of the working dam.

xm.STRIKESIN FASCIST

AND WHITE TERROR

COUPJTRIES.
In countries where fascism and the white terror reign,
the overwhelming majorib of strikes are eporadic sfxikeg.

This means that in these countries the adherenb of the
Profintern hhve thus far been unable to penetrate into
the factories, despite the measures of repression, in order
to influence the pulling of s w e s , the demands, and the
results of strtkes. Consequently it is specially important
in countries of this type, to work directly inside the factory. For it is only from within the factory that economic
and political movements may rise and be given vent.
In countries where the very presentation of economic
demands ie punishable by law, the pmblem k neverthelem
to draw the largest number of workers into the taslr of
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working out and presenting their economic demands. The
demands should
prepared according to crafts, and
should be presented to the management by large delegar
tiom of from 100 to 200 workers. This, howevex, muat
by no means be taken as a strict and fast rule to be
applied to all countries. Changes muat be made according
to peculiar conditiom existing in each fascist or white
terror country. Aho, under no drcumstances should the
delegation be mmposed of all the leading active workers.
We mwt not expose all the leading active workera to
measmres of repression and terror practiced by the aemy.
Delegates should and must be elected to take up questions
even of the slightest importance which immediately concern the interests of the workers.
In those countries, it is especially important to choose
a staunch and determined hitrike committee. During d m
tiona of strike m m i t h s the possibility of m ~ t and
a
repressions must be kept in mind ; therefore, a, amall group
which could continue the leadership of .the rstrike in case
of meats or repreasiom must be chosen out of the broader strike committee.

In these countries- information and connections are
cspeciany important, and for this purpose it is nece88ar.v
to set up an illegal apparatus. A ~trikers'defense corps,
cumposed directly of workera, against the fascist band3
is of great importance in these oountries. It is most important during every strike to stubbornly strive ta come
out into the open and utilize the slightest hitch during
the strike to come up from underground

XIV. HOW TO GIVE POLITZCAL CONTENT
TO STRIKES,
Because of the concentration of capital and the practie
of the bourgeoisie and refomists to m p h strikes by
obligatory arbitration, every strike acquires golitid char, acter, T h i ~
doe8 not mean that all the workers undemhd
C
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the political, i.e., the $ e n d class eigniricmce of -the
current economic struggles. In this situation, it is the
task of the wdherenh of the Profintern to teach the

mmsea politim on the basis of the everyday struggle.
This memu it is necessary tb issue slogans at each stage
of the akuggle, on the basis of the demands, which will
raise the f i h t to a higher level.
To give politid content to sMkes does not mean to
talk about @ti= in the absbct, but it means b 00~~1ect
up the immediate demands with demands of a more general character.
The rndority of strikes suf€er from xepreasion, government protection of strikebreakers, obliga,tory arbitration, etc. The principal thing ia to have the workm understand frm h&~
experknees i* the e t w g p k thut the govmmerct i s pmt&irag the employers against the workers,
that the courts, p a s , church, eh., which are isupposed
to be beyond the &uses, are also in the pay of the employers. The woikers muat realize that every large
economic conflict means the placing of class e
t h. ,I
It is important not to put forth hmany slogans at one
time and to remember that o d y that political slogan will
be of any value which i8' closely connected with the
development and the circumsbncea of the given economic
conflict. Militant political sfogans (demsnds) flowing from
a given skrike, maJr in their entirety aomprise that
united political platfom upon which the workers of all
political beliefs (including the non-Party workers) may
unite.

The enthushum prevailing among the maws during
strikes should be utilirted for atrengthening the campaign
for the defense of the Soviet Union. Every worker must
understand the very dose connection between the preparations for war against the proletarian atate, and the intensification of all means of expIoitation, repmion and
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hrmr which a p i b h n is forcing upon him for the a k e
of capitalist stabilization. During strikes the revolutiomry
trade unions must give e1pwh1 attention to mobilizing the
workers in those industries which can easily be converted
into war industries. Also, among the d m y workers it
is necessary to b p u h h the slogans of the general
strike, mass strikes and tying up of kramqmrtation in war
time. In the struggle against imperialist war it is necessary to f i h t against all foms of milihry organizations
and militarization functioning in the m hops and factories.

XV. FORMS AND METHODS OF ORGANIZING THE
TRADE UNION OPPOSITION (LEFT WING)
IN ALL COENTRIES.
Exgeriences of recent sMkes in France, Germany and
Polmd have shown that 10-1 organizations do not receive
sufficient aid and support during strikes, from the Party,
revolutionary b i d e union centers, and the trsde union op
position. At the aame time, the revolutionary trade unions
and the trde union opposition can give d v e lademhip
only on the condition that we are able to mobilize d2
the forces at oar diapod. Therefore, the most important
tasks before the revolutiomry unions and the opposition
are the following:
1. At the approach of a conflict in some industrg to
transfer our best forces to the place of battle,
2. To adopt all our agitation and propaganda to the
importance and significance of the conflict.
3. To give spedd apace in the press to t h e conflict,
drawing the strikers in as correspondents.
4. To concentrate all the work of the revolutionarg
unions, and the trade union opposition towards aiding the
strike. To change the routine work of the unions in such
a manner as to afford the strike the maximum assistance.
6. To institute a strict check-up on a militmy f m h g

over the activities of everyone d g n e d ta a definih
branch of work.
6. To &we spe& a t t m t h du&ng the eErike to draw
ing new f m e s i ~ t the
o J d i ~ cmrraittses
g
from among the
raab of the worker-,
wonam a@ ~ m w workwsg
involved in the conflict of thia bran& of indus*.
Hundreds and thousands of workers can be found who would
carry on a tremendous amount of voluntary work.
7, To establish permanent, live contact between the
leading committees of a h g g l e and the central leadership
of the revolutionary W e Upiom.
8. In order to'mobme all forces for the support of
the struggle, the workem in the immediate leademhip
must truthfully report the situation am it is, without lending it m y color.

XVX. WORK AMONG WORKING WOMEN AND
WORKING CLASS HOUSE'FKIVES.
Drawing women into the strike w u m e s especial importance in connection with the rationalization of industry
and the growth of f e d e labor, Experiences have pmven
that working women and wivea of workers play a very
large role in atriErea and l&uts,
and therefore, it is
necesamy:
1. While work is still in its prepmtory stage, to give
special sttention to the organization of working women,
and to include in the general demands, such demands
as especially concern m e n .
hw .
2. To draw working women and workers' wivk "mto
active work at the outbreak of the strike, charging them
with various functiom of an agitationd and o r ~ t i a ~
chamcter, d e f work, e k , md creating for thia purpose
during the trike tqwid committees composed of atxikers*
wives.

P-WHS

-

.

OF S m t l K E m T m Y

46

3. To crerPte special flJring ;squadmnsof working women
to work among working claw hou8ewivea.
4. In dating anti-lixkout or &ike d t t e q to we
tn it that a.n&'idmt pementage of working women arr!
included. In those factories where the vast majorie of
work- rn women, the majorily of the strike committee
must be composed of wome~l
5. All delegations for the p
of estabbldng eonwith other Wm and other fndtu@m mu& -.
lately include working women.
6. If a large number of working faomen are invoked
in a trike or lockon& it b n e w m y to wvoke spwhl
working women'^ confereneea ta prepare "m organized Eorm
the general demands of the working women, and h maintain the most active women workem on s i k e committees,
However, this by no means should exdude the working
women from holding general confm~1~8s
with the working
men; on the wntrsyt this ia absolutely nwwmy, '
7. In view of the fact that in liquidating strikes, E+
formkta usually rerrch an agreement with the employera
at the expense of the weakest categories aP the proletariat
(women workem and young workers) it ia necmary, w'
W y t o w d the termbtim of the adlick to aee to it
that the interest of these categories are pmkcted.

*
'

XVIL FORMS AND ~ ~ O OFD ORGANIZING
S
YOUNG WORKERS.
h r h g economic c o n f l i h s@d atbtion should be
paid to p m m the h k a h of the young woxkem and
d r a m them into d v e work. In woddq out tbe
d d , it b ahIntdy newwary to incInde iqmM pdnb
the labor of young workem, and during eI&=
of committeeis, young workmi mmt be drawn in on an
equtrl footing. with ddt workem. YO- workem can play
.a d&ve
rola on the picket b e , in defeme cow, h the
l e s b b K & h g of contacts, in checking up the execution of

decbions made by the lading bodia, in the distribution
of strike committee leaflets, etc, e k A de&rmiq+d battle
must be waged against the socialdemocmtic tradition of
considering young workers as a category undeserving of
any attention.
The adherenh of the Profintern must remember that
the activization of the whole movement depends to a great
extent upon its ability to draw masses of young workers
into the sbugg1e.
It would be desirable to ereate you& mmmksions on
all strike committeen for s p e w work among the youth,
in order to draw all the young workers and studenta into
a well knit strike front.
13Vm. ORGANJ[WNG S T R m RELIEF.
Dnring zt atrike the quwtion of relief is very important
In view of the fact that t0e refomkt uniom mbotage
the movement, often dalarmg it to be an outlaw e w e
in order to justify their refusal to give aid to the strikers,
and further, that the refoFmista look with eontempt upon
€he unorganized, refusing them even the most meagre
relief, it is the task of the tmde union opposition and the
strike committees to procure the greatest possible amount
of relief for the workers on strike and those locked out.
For this purpose it is n e c e a w :
1, To demand that the unions give assistance to dI
locked out and striking workers.
2. To demand that the union allow a definite sum as
strike knefit for the unorganized.
8. To arrange wcial collections among all workers
-out
the country for relief funds to be distributed
among the organized as weU as the unorganized.
4. To draw into this h k the Workers International

Relief, which must function as an auxiliary organization
during economic struggles. In countries where independent
trade union organizations exist, it is the task of these
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tmions to give.&& to the
tions of the Workers fnhma
cipate in this work.
To give partialax attention to the need of

work it will be n m s w y to ovemme the
the cooperative f u n c t i o d e
strikes as no affairs of theira.
& To place before city committees and garhmenb
o w demands for the relief of ~trikem'and Iocked oat workers' md their families, These d-ds
muat be mmwked
and emphasized by delegations and demoashtiom of tbe

XIXI THE PROELm OF INFORMATION AND '
CONNECTIONS.
The W c b k during strikes i~ ta connect the elect&

i

a to what is happening. For this purpose it is necmwy:
1. To have regular meetings of the strike committee.
Regular reports of those meefhgs are to be made to the
strikers.
2. To hzve regular repoxts in the press on the development of the strike.
8. To have the strike committee publieb a iqdd
paper or bulletin bmed on a united platform for W
struggle. m
s
t organ must #my regalsr r e p o h on the
development of the strike, the d v i t i e a of the &trike
committee with regard to relief, e k
4. To EZE€UUY follow and to deny, thra the generid
left wing press and the stnke committee balletin, wewking that the burgeoia and aociddemocratic prm wri&
about the ~Hka
6. For information and con&
to UW
the W u r k d
qwrt o x g m h t i m , mch as bicycle m s , mdio 811th~-

,
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aimta, etc. Physical training chams mu& .and should be
utilized during a w e s for eshblbhing a permanent conk t between the workers of various shopa and various
dia&icta.
XX. ESTABLISHING CONTACrS WITH TRADE
UNION ORGANIZATZONS IN OTHER
COUNTRn3S.
Notwithstanding the fact that the conflicts in Northern
France in Munchen-Gladbach, and in Lo& o c m d almosq
simultan80wly, there waa no contact between these various workem Such contad during the strike would have
been of great bendt. Themfom, in this regard it b
n-sary
to do the following:
L It is deElirable to dect special delegatiom to e ~ t a b
liah contact with workers of other distxicts and industria
2. In the c a of~ huge strike, it ia deshbIe that the
strike commithe appeal to all workem in foreign coaxlkiesi
for mpporL
3. Infomatin should be releamd to the intemat£onal
pmss an the development of the strike and the metho&
of struggle.
4. Send regular reports to the Profintern and Comintern xegarding every detail of the conflict.
5. Expose the inactivity and antagonism of the m
formist interntionah to the strike.
,

CONCLUSIONS.

In conclusion, we wish to draw to

the attention of all
the adhe~ntsof 'the Profintern that the ~esolutiona
adopted at the IX plenum of the Executive Conunittee of
the Communist International, the nT Congress of the Red
International of Trde Unions and the VI Congress of the
Communist Inknational =garding the gmblems of working within the trade uniom are still in force. h a m u c h a ~
the economic stmggle
become the center of attention

for all Communist parties, r e ~ l u t trade
i ~ unions and
r m d u opposition,
~
the ComInbm and the BdnterP
will most carerhxlly follow all economic conflict& They
will m t timely to an the developnenb in tbeae mnflicb
in each cormtry, a d render dl the aid within their power
w, 4
dnring the P - ~ V
perlod,
ttt the o u t b of
~ 1 s b i , Only w i t h EU& combined

hted orgmhations, is it psible, with the m d m m n h
fit to the international working elm movement, ta u m
the p a t economic: conflicts and take the Ieadership of the
m a a m out of the hands of inhmationcrl reformism.

.

